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Abstract—Security aspects of the Index Coding with Side
Information (ICSI) problem are investigated. Building on the
results of Bar-Yossef et al. (2006), the properties of linear coding
schemes for the ICSI problem are further explored. The notion
of weak security, considered by Bhattad and Narayanan (2005)
in the context of network coding, is generalized to block security.
It is shown that the coding scheme for the ICSI problem based
on a linear code C of length n, minimum distance d and dual
distance d⊥, is (d− 1− t)-block secure (and hence also weakly
secure) if the adversary knows in advance t ≤ d− 2 messages,
and is completely insecure if the adversary knows in advance
more than n− d⊥ messages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of Index Coding with Side Information (ICSI)
was introduced by Birk and Kol [1], [2]. It was motivated by
applications such as audio and video-on-demand, and daily
newspaper delivery. In these applications a server (sender)
has to deliver some sets of data, audio or video files to
the set of clients (receivers), different sets are requested by
different receivers. Assume that before the transmission starts,
the receivers have already (from previous transmissions) some
files or movies in their possession. Via a slow backward
channel, the receivers can let the sender know which messages
they already have in their possession, and which messages
they request. By exploiting this information, the amount of
the overall transmissions can be reduced. As it was observed
in [1], this can be achieved by coding the messages at the
server before broadcasting them out.
Another possible application of the ICSI problem is in
opportunistic wireless networks. These are the networks in
which a wireless node can opportunistically listen to the
wireless channel. As a result, the node may obtain packets
that were not designated to it (see [3]–[5]). This way, a node
obtains some side information about the transmitted data.
Exploiting this additional knowledge may help to increase the
throughput of the system.
Consider the toy example in Figure 1. It presents a scenario
with one sender and four receivers. Each receiver requires a
different information packet (or message). The naı¨ve approach
requires four separate transmissions, one transmission per an
information packet. However, by exploiting the knowledge
about the subsets of messages that clients already have, and
by using coding of the transmitted data, the server can satisfy
all the demands by broadcasting just one coded packet.
The ICSI problem has been a subject of several recent
studies [3], [6]–[12]. This problem can be regarded as a special
case of the well-known network coding (NC) problem [13]. In
Fig. 1. An example of the ICSI problem
particular, it was shown that every instance of the NC problem
can be reduced to an instance of the ICSI problem [3], [10].
Several previous works focused on the design of an efficient
scheme for the ICSI problem. Bar-Yossef et al. [6] proved
that finding the best scalar linear binary solution for the ICSI
problem is equivalent to finding the so-called minrank of a
graph, which is known to be an NP-hard problem (see [6],
[14]). Here scalar linear solutions refer to linear schemes in
which each message is a symbol in the field Fq . By contrast,
in vector linear solutions each message is a vector over Fq .
Lubetzky and Stav [7] showed that there exist instances in
which scalar linear solutions over nonbinary fields and linear
solutions over mixed fields outperform the scalar linear binary
solutions. The latter were also studied by Bar-Yossef et al. [6].
El Rouayheb et. al. [3], [10] and Alon et al. [12] showed
that for certain instances of the ICSI problem, vector linear
solutions achieve strictly higher transmission rate than scalar
linear solutions do. They also pointed out that there exist
instances in which nonlinear codes outperform linear codes.
Several heuristic solutions for the ICSI problem were proposed
in [9], [11].
In this paper, we study the security aspect of a linear
solution for the ICSI problem. We show that every linear
scheme provides a certain level of security. More specifically,
let n and k be the length and the dimension of the code C,
associated with a particular ICSI instance. Let d and d⊥ be
its minimum distance and dual distance, respectively. We say
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2that a particular adversary is of strength t if it has t packets
of information in its possession. Then, we show that a scheme
employing the code C is (d − 1 − t)-block secure against all
adversaries of strength t ≤ d − 2 and is completely insecure
against any adversary of strength at least n − d⊥ + 1. If the
code C is MDS, then the two bounds coincide.
The paper is organized as follows. Notations and definitions,
which are used in the rest of the paper, are introduced in
Section II. The model and some basic results for the ICSI
problem are presented in Section III. The security properties
of linear ICSI schemes are analyzed in Section IV. The main
results of this paper appear in that section. Finally, the paper
is concluded in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use the notation Fq for the finite field of q elements,
where q is a power of prime, and F∗q for the set of all nonzero
elements of Fq . We also use [n] to denote the set of integers
{1, 2, . . . , n}. For the vectors u = (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ Fnq and
v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ Fnq , the (Hamming) distance between
u and v is defined to be the number of coordinates where u
and v differ, namely,
d(u,v) = |{i ∈ [n] : ui 6= vi}| .
The support of a vector u ∈ Fnq is defined to be the set
supp(u) = {i ∈ [n] : ui 6= 0}. The (Hamming) weight of
a vector u, denoted wt(u), is defined to be |supp(u)|, the
number of nonzero coordinates of u.
A k-dimensional subspace C of Fnq is called a linear
[n, k, d]q (q-ary) code if the minimum distance of C,
d(C) 4= min
u∈C, v∈C, u6=v
d(u,v) ,
is equal to d. Sometimes we may use the notation [n, k]q for
the sake of simplicity. The vectors in C are called codewords. It
is easy to see that the minimum weight of a nonzero codeword
in a linear code C is equal to its minimum distance d(C). A
generator matrix G of an [n, k]q-code C is a k × n matrix
whose rows are linearly independent codewords of C. Then
C = {yG : y ∈ Fkq}.
The dot product of the two vectors u,v ∈ Fnq is defined
to be u · v = ∑ni=1 uivi ∈ Fq . Thus, u · v = uvT , the
normal matrix product of u and vT , where vT denotes the
transpose of v. The dual code or dual space of C is defined
as C⊥ = {u ∈ Fnq : u · c = 0 for all c ∈ C}. The minimum
distance of C⊥, d(C⊥), is called the dual distance of C.
The following upper bound on the minimum distance of a
q-ary linear code is well-known (see [15] Chapter 1).
Theorem 2.1 (Singleton bound): For an [n, k, d]q-code, we
have d ≤ n− k + 1.
Codes attaining this bound are called maximum distance
separable (MDS) codes. For a subset of vectors
{c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k)} ⊆ Fnq ,
define its linear span:
span
(
{c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k)}
)
4
={
k∑
i=1
αic
(i) : αi ∈ Fq, i ∈ [k]
}
.
We use ei = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i
) ∈ Fnq to denote the
unit vector, which has a one at the ith position, and zeros
elsewhere. We also use In, n ∈ N, to denote the n×n identity
matrix.
We recall the following well-known result in coding theory.
Theorem 2.2 ( [16], p. 66): Let C be an [n, k, d]q-code
with dual distance d⊥ and M denote the qk×n matrix whose
qk rows are codewords of C. If r ≤ d⊥ − 1 then each r-tuple
from Fq appears in an arbitrary set of r columns of M exactly
qk−r times.
For a random vector Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) and a subset
B = {i1, i2, . . . , ib} of [n], where i1 < i2 < . . . < ib, let YB
denote the vector (Yi1 , Yi2 , . . . , Yib). For a k×n matrix M, let
Mj denote the jth column of M, and M[i] its ith row. For a
set E ⊆ [n], let ME denote the k× |E| matrix obtained from
M by deleting all the columns of M which are not indexed
by the elements of E.
Let X and Y be discrete random variables taking values
in the sets ΣX and ΣY , respectively. Let Pr(X = x) denote
the probability that X takes a particular value x ∈ ΣX . The
(binary) entropy of X is defined as
H2(X) = −
∑
x∈ΣX
Pr(X = x) · log2 Pr(X = x) .
The conditional entropy of X given Y is defined as
H2(X|Y ) =
−
∑
x∈ΣX ,y∈ΣY
Pr(X = x, Y = y) · log2 Pr(X = x|Y = y) .
This definition can be naturally extended to
H2(X|Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) ,
for n discrete random variables Yi, i ∈ [n].
If the probability distribution of X is unchanged given the
knowledge of Y , i.e., Pr(X = x|Y = y) = Pr(X = x) for all
x ∈ ΣX , y ∈ ΣY , then H2(X|Y ) = H2(X). Indeed, H2(X|Y )
equals
−
∑
x∈ΣX
 ∑
y∈ΣY
Pr(X = x, Y = y)
 · log2 Pr(X = x)
= −
∑
x∈ΣX
Pr(X = x) · log2 Pr(X = x)
= H2(X) .
3III. INDEX CODING AND SOME BASIC RESULTS
A. Linear Coding Model
Index coding problem considers the following communi-
cations scenario. There is a unique sender (or source) S,
who has a vector of messages x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq
in his possession, which is a realized value of a random
vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). X1, X2, . . . , Xn hereafter
are assumed to be independent uniformly distributed random
variables over Fq . There are also m receivers R1, R2, . . . , Rm.
For each j ∈ [m], Rj has some side information, i.e. Rj owns
a subset of messages {xi}i∈Xj , Xj ⊆ [n]. In addition, each
Rj , j ∈ [m], is interested in receiving the message xf(j),
for some demand function f : [m] → [n]. Hereafter, we
assume that every receiver requests exactly one message. The
scenario, where each receiver requests more than one message,
is discussed in Section III-B.
Let X0 ⊆ [n] and u ∈ Fnq . In the sequel, we write uC X0
if for any ui 6= 0 it holds i ∈ X0. Intuitively, this means that
if some receiver knows xi for all i ∈ X0 (and also knows u),
then this receiver is also able to compute the value of u · x.
In this paper we consider linear index coding. In particular,
we assume that S broadcasts a vector of k ∈ N linear
combinations s = (s1, s2, . . . , sk) ∈ Fkq , each combination
is of the form
sj = c
(j)
1 x1 + c
(j)
2 x2 + · · ·+ c(j)n xn = c(j) · x ,
for j ∈ [k], where {c(j) = (c(j)1 , c(j)2 , . . . , c(j)n )}j∈[k] is a
linearly independent set of vectors in Fnq . Let the code C of
length n and dimension k over Fq be defined as
C 4= span({c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k)}) .
Hereafter, we assume that the sets Xj for j ∈ [m] are known
to S. Moreover, we also assume that the code C is known to
each receiver Rj , j ∈ [m]. In practice this can be achieved by
a preliminary communication session, when the knowledge of
the sets Xj for j ∈ [m] and of the code C are disseminated
between the participants of the scheme.
The following lemma was formulated in [6] for the case
where Fq is a binary field. This lemma specifies a sufficient
condition on C so that the coding scheme is successful, i.e.
any Rj has enough data to reconstruct xf(j), j ∈ [m], at the
end of the communication session. We reproduce this lemma
(for the general Fq) with its proof for the sake of completeness
of the presentation.
Lemma 3.1: Let C be an [n, k]q-code and let
{c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k)} be a basis of C. Suppose S broadcasts
vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sk) = (c(1) · x, c(2) · x, . . . , c(k) · x).
Then, for each j ∈ [m], the receiver Rj can reconstruct xf(j)
if the following two conditions hold:
1) there exists u ∈ Fnq such that uC Xj ;
2) the vector u+ ef(j) is in C.
Proof: Assume that u C Xj and u + ef(j) ∈ C. Since
u+ ef(j) ∈ C, we obtain that there exist β1, β2, . . . , βk ∈ Fq
such that
(u+ ef(j)) +
k∑
j=1
βjc
(j) = 0 .
By multiplying by x, we obtain that
(u+ ef(j)) · x+
k∑
j=1
βj
(
c(j) · x)
= (u+ ef(j)) · x+
k∑
j=1
βjsj = 0 . (1)
Therefore,
xf(j) = −
k∑
j=1
βjsj − u · x .
Observe that Rj is able to find u and all βj from the
knowledge of the code C. Moreover, Rj is also able to compute
u ·x since uCXj . Therefore, Rj is able to compute xf(j).
Lemma 3.1 suggests that in order for the receivers to recover
their desired symbols, S can use the code C = span({v(j) +
ef(j)}j∈[m]), for some v(j) C Xj , j ∈ [m]. We show later
in Corollary 4.3 that S must use a code of such form to
guarantee a successful communication session. Finding the
lowest dimension code by careful selection of v(j)’s is a
difficult task (in fact it is NP-hard to do so, see [6], [14]),
which, however, yields a scheme with the minimal number of
transmissions.
B. Receivers with Multiple Requests
Consider a more general ICSI problem where each receiver
requests more than one message. This problem was discussed
in [1]. It was shown therein that there exists an equivalent
problem with one requested message per each receiver. This
new problem is easily obtained by splitting each receiver,
which requests ρ > 1 messages, into ρ different receivers
with the same side information, where each receiver requests
exactly one message. For more detail, the reader can refer
to [1]. In the sequel, we consider scenarios, where each
receiver requests exactly one message.
C. Scalar and Vector Solutions
The type of linear solutions considered in this model are
referred to as scalar linear solutions in [10], [12]. For vector
linear solutions, each message is divided into several packets,
each packet is a symbol in Fq , and a coding scheme combines
packets from different messages to minimize the number of
transmissions. It was shown in [12] (see also [3], [10]) that
there exist instances of the problem in which a vector linear
solution has significantly higher transmission rate than any
scalar linear solution. Here, the transmission rate of a scheme
is defined as the number of packet transmissions required for
delivery of one packet to each receiver.
However, if each message consists of ρ packets (symbols
in Fq), then a vector linear solution of this instance can
be regarded as a scalar linear solution (over Fq) of another
4instance of the index coding problem, where each receiver
requests exactly ρ messages in Fq . This instance, in turn, is
equivalent to an instance of the ICSI problem considered in
this paper. Therefore, the two identical q-ary linear codes of
length n can be used for these two equivalent ICSI problems.
In that case, in order to study the security of the vector linear
solution of an instance of the ICSI problem, it is enough to
study the security of the equivalent scalar linear solution of
some other instance of the ICSI problem.
IV. BLOCK SECURE LINEAR INDEX CODING
A. Block Security and Weak Security
In Section IV, we present our main results. Hereafter,
we assume the presence of an adversary A who can lis-
ten to all transmissions. Let C be an [n, k]q-code, and
{c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k)} be a basis of C. Let G be a generator
matrix of C whose rows are c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k). Suppose S
broadcasts s = (s1, s2, . . . , sk) = (c(1) · x, c(2) · x, . . . , c(k) ·
x). The adversary is assumed to possess side information
{xi}i∈XA , where XA ⊂ [n]. For short, we say that A knows
xXA . The strength of an adversary is defined to be |XA|.
Denote X̂A 4= ([n]\XA) 6= ∅. Note that from listening to
S, the adversary also knows sT = GxT . We define below
several levels of security for ICSI schemes.
Definition 4.1: Consider an ICSI scheme, which is based on
a linear code C. The sender S possesses a vector of messages
x ∈ Fnq , which is a realized value of a random vector X. An
adversary A possesses {xi}i∈XA .
1) For B ⊆ X̂A, the adversary is said to have no information
about xB if
H2(XB |GXT ,XXA) = H2(XB) . (2)
In other words, despite the partial knowledge on x that the
adversary has (his side information and the symbols he
overheard), the symbols xB still looks completely random
to him.
2) The scheme is said to be b-block secure against XA if for
every b-subset B ⊆ X̂A, the adversary has no information
about xB .
3) The scheme is said to be b-block secure against all
adversaries of strength t (0 6 t 6 n− 1) if it is b-block
secure against XA for every XA ⊂ [n], |XA| = t.
4) The scheme is said to be weakly secure against XA if it is
1-block secure against XA. In other words, after listening
to all transmissions, the adversary has no information
about each particular message that he does not possess
in the first place.
5) The scheme is said to be weakly secure against all
adversaries of strength t (0 6 t 6 n− 1) if it is weakly
secure against XA for every t-subset XA of [n].
6) The scheme is said to be completely insecure against XA
if an adversary, who possesses {xi}i∈XA , by listening to
all transmissions, is able to determine xi for all i ∈ X̂A.
7) The scheme is said to be completely insecure against any
adversary of strength t (0 6 t 6 n − 1) if an adversary,
who possesses an arbitrary set of t messages, is always
able to reconstruct all of the other n − t messages after
listening to all transmissions.
Even when the scheme is b-block secure (b ≥ 1) as defined
above, the adversary is still able to obtain information about
dependencies between various xi’s in X̂A (but he gains no
information about any group of b particular messages). This
definition of b-block security is a generalization of that of
weak security (see [17], [18]). Obviously, if a scheme is b-
block secure against XA (b ≥ 1) then it is also weakly secure
against XA, but the converse is not always true.
B. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Block Security
In the sequel, we consider the sets B ⊆ [n], B 6= ∅, and
E ⊆ [n], E 6= ∅. Moreover, we assume that the sets XA,
B, and E are disjoint, and that they form a partition of [n],
namely XA ∪B ∪ E = [n]. In particular, X̂A = B ∪ E.
Lemma 4.1: Assume that for all uCXA and for all αi ∈ Fq ,
i ∈ B (not all αi’s are zeros),
u+
∑
i∈B
αiei /∈ C . (3)
Then,
1) for all i ∈ B:
Gi ∈ span({Gj}j∈E) ; (4)
2) the system
GEy
T = GBw
T (5)
has at least one solution y ∈ F|E|q for every choice of
w ∈ F|B|q .
Proof:
1) If rank(GE) = k then the first claim follows imme-
diately. Otherwise, assume that rank(GE) < k. As
the k rows of GE are linearly dependent, there exists
y ∈ Fkq\{0} such that yGE = 0.
• If for all such y and for all i ∈ B we have
yGi = 0, then Gi ∈ ((span({Gj}j∈E))⊥)⊥ =
span({Gj}j∈E) for all i ∈ B.
• Otherwise, there exist y ∈ Fkq and i ∈ B such that
yGE = 0 and yGi 6= 0. Without loss of generality,
assume that G = (GXA |GB |GE). Let c = yG ∈ C.
Then
c = (cXA |cB |cE) = (yGXA |yGB |yGE) .
Hence cB = yGB 6= 0 and cE = yGE = 0. Let
u = (cXA |0|0)CXA and αi = ci for all i ∈ B. Then
αi’s are not all zero and u +
∑
i∈B αiei = c ∈ C,
which contradicts (3).
2) By (4), each column of GB is a linear combination
of columns of GE . Hence GBwT is also a linear
combination of columns of GE . Therefore, (5) has at
least one solution.
5The following lemma provides us with a criteria to decide
whether a particular scheme (based on a code C) is block
secure against the adversary A or not. This lemma is a
generalization of Lemma 3.1 in the following senses. First,
while Lemma 3.1 does not discuss security, observe that the
adversary can be viewed as one of the receivers. Then, the
sufficient conditions (1) and (2) in Lemma 3.1 (when applied
to A and XA) are also sufficient conditions for successful
reconstruction of a symbol by A. Below, we show that these
conditions are also necessary. Additionally, in the lemma
below, the weak security, implied by the aforementioned
generalization, is further extended to block security. (Note that
similar statement can be formulated with respect to receivers
Rj .)
Lemma 4.2: For a subset B ⊆ X̂A, the adversary, after
listening to all transmissions, has no information about xB
if and only if
∀uC XA, ∀αi ∈ Fq with αi, i ∈ B, not all zero :
u+
∑
i∈B
αiei /∈ C . (6)
In particular, for each i /∈ XA, A has no information about xi
if and only if
∀uC XA : u+ ei /∈ C .
Proof: Assume that (6) holds. We need to show that the
entropy of XB is not changed given the knowledge of GXT
and XXA . Hence, as shown in Section II, it suffices to show
that for all g ∈ F|B|q :
Pr(XB = g|GXT = sT , XXA = xXA) =
1
q|B|
. (7)
Consider the following linear system with the unknown z ∈ Fnq
zB = g
zXA = xXA
GzT = sT
,
which is equivalent to
zB = g
zXA = xXA
GEz
T
E = s
T−GBgT−GXAxTXA
. (8)
In order to prove that (7) holds, it suffices to show that for
all choices of g ∈ F|B|q , (8) always has the same number of
solutions z. Notice that the number of solutions z of (8) is
equal to the number of solutions zE of
GEz
T
E = s
T −GBgT −GXAxTXA , (9)
where s, g, and xXA are known. For any g ∈ F|B|q , if (9) has a
solution, then it has exactly q|E|−rank(GE) different solutions.
Therefore, it suffices to prove that (9) has at least one solution
for every g ∈ F|B|q .
Since x is an obvious solution of (8), we have
GEx
T
E = s
T −GBxTB −GXAxTXA . (10)
Subtract (10) from (9) we obtain
GE(z
T
E − xTE) = GB(xTB − gT ) ,
which can be rewritten as
GEy
T = GBw
T , (11)
where y 4= zE − xE , w 4= xB − g. Due to Lemma 4.1, (11)
always has a solution y, for every choice of w. Therefore (9)
has at least one solution for every g ∈ F|B|q .
Now we prove the converse. Assume that (6) does not hold.
Then there exists u C XA and αi ∈ Fq , i ∈ B, where αi’s,
i ∈ B are not all zero, such that∑
i∈B
αiei = c− u ,
for some c ∈ C. Hence, similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1,
the adversary obtains∑
i∈B
αixi =
(∑
i∈B
αiei
)
· x
= (c− u) · x
= c · x− u · x .
Note that the adversary can calculate c · x from s, and can
also find u · x based on his own side information. Therefore,
A is able to compute a nontrivial linear combination of xi’s,
i ∈ B. Hence the entropy H2(XB |GXT ,XXA) < H2(XB).
Thus, the adversary has some information about the xB .
We have the following straight-forward corollary. It general-
izes Lemma 3.1 by providing both the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the weak security. (Note, that this corollary
considers the receiver Rj rather than the adversary A, since
the arguments of Lemma 4.2 also apply to all receivers.)
Corollary 4.3: For each j ∈ [m], the receiver Rj can
reconstruct xf(j), f(j) /∈ Xj , if and only if
1) there exists u ∈ Fnq such that uC Xj ;
2) the vector u+ ef(j) is in C.
Corollary 4.3 suggests that in order for the receivers to
recover their desired messages, it is necessary and sufficient to
employ a code C of the form C = span({v(j) + ef(j)}j∈[m]),
for some v(j) C Xj , j ∈ [m].
Theorem 4.4: Suppose that the source S broadcasts
s = (c(1) · x, c(2) · x, . . . , c(k) · x) ,
where {c(1), c(2), . . . , c(k)} is a basis of C = span({v(j) +
ef(j)}j∈[m]), for some v(j) C Xj , j ∈ [m]. Let d be the
minimum distance of C. Then
1) The scheme is (d− 1− t)-block secure against all adver-
saries of strength t 6 d− 2. In particular, the scheme is
weakly secure against all adversaries of strength t = d−2.
2) The scheme is not weakly secure against at least one
adversary of strength t = d− 1. More generally, if there
exists a codeword of weight w, then the scheme is not
6weakly secure against at least one adversary of strength
t = w − 1.
3) Every adversary of strength t ≤ d−1 is able to determine
a list of qn−t−k vectors in Fnq which includes the vector
of messages x.
Proof:
1) Observe that by Corollary 4.3, every Rj , j ∈ [m], can
reconstruct xf(j), f(j) /∈ Xj . Assume that t ≤ d− 2. By
Lemma 4.2, it suffices to show that for every t-subset XA
of [n] and for every (d− 1− t)-subset B of X̂A,
∀uC XA, ∀αi ∈ Fq with αi, i ∈ B, not all zero :
u+
∑
i∈B
αiei /∈ C . (12)
For such u and αi’s, we have wt(u +
∑
i∈B αiei) ≤
wt(u) + wt(
∑
i∈B αiei) ≤ t+ (d− 1− t) = d− 1 < d.
Moreover, as supp(u) ∩ B = ∅ and αi’s, i ∈ B, are
not all zero, we deduce that u +
∑
i∈B αiei 6= 0. We
conclude that u+
∑
i∈B αiei /∈ C.
2) We now show that the scheme is not weakly secure
against at least one adversary of strength t = d− 1. The
more general statement can be proved in an analogous
way.
Pick a codeword c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C such that
wt(c) = d and let supp(c) = {i1, i2, . . . , id}. Take
XA = {i1, i2, . . . , id−1}, |XA| = d− 1. Let
u = (c/cid − eid) .
Then, u C XA and u + eid = c/cid ∈ C. By Lemma
3.1, A is able to determine xid . Hence the scheme is not
weakly secure against the adversary A, who knows d−1
messages xi’s in advance.
3) Consider the following linear system of equations with
unknown z ∈ Fnq{
zXA = xXA
GzT = sT
,
which is equivalent to{
zXA = xXA
GX̂Az
T
X̂A = s
T −GXAxTXA
. (13)
The adversary A attempts to solve this system. Given
that s and xXA are known, the system (13) has n − t
unknowns and k equations. Note that t ≤ d−1, and thus
by Theorem 2.1 we have n − t ≥ n − d + 1 ≥ k. If
rank(GX̂A) = k then (13) has exactly q
n−t−k solutions,
as required.
Next, we show that rank(GX̂A) = k. Assume, by con-
trary, that the k rows of GX̂A , denoted by r1, r2, . . . , rk,
are linearly dependent. Then there exist βi ∈ Fq , i ∈ [k],
not all zero, such that
∑k
i=1 βiri = 0. Let
c =
k∑
i=1
βi ·G[i] ∈ C\{0} .
(Recall that G[i] denotes the i-th row of G). Then
cX̂A =
∑k
i=1 βiri = 0 and hence wt(c) = wt(cXA) 6
t ≤ d − 1. This is a contradiction, which follows from
the assumption that the k rows of GX̂A are linearly
dependent.
Example 4.1: Let q = 2. Assume that XA = ∅ and that
Xj 6= ∅ for all j ∈ [m]. Consider a linear scheme for the ICSI
problem, employing an [n, k, d]2-code C with d = 2, which is
defined as follows. For each j ∈ [m] choose some ij ∈ Xj .
Let C = span({eij + ef(j)}j∈[m]). Then, indeed, d(C) = 2.
Since t = |XA| = 0, we have d − 1 − t = 1. Therefore by
Theorem 4.4 the scheme employing C is weakly secure against
A. Moreover, if C is nontrivial (and so k < n − d + 1), we
have k ≤ n− d = n− 2.
C. Block Security and Complete Insecurity
Theorem 4.4 provides a threshold for the security level of
a scheme that uses a given linear code C. If A has a prior
knowledge of any t 6 d − 2 messages, then the scheme is
still secure, i.e. the adversary has no information about any
d−1−t particular messages from {xi}i∈X̂A . On the other hand,
the scheme may no longer be secure against an adversary of
strength t = d−1. The last assertion of Theorem 4.4 shows us
the difference between being block secure and being (strongly)
secure in a commonly used sense (see, for instance [19]). More
specifically, if the scheme is (strongly) secure, the messages
look completely random to the adversary, i.e. the probability
to guess the correct messages is 1/qn. However, if the scheme
is (d−1−t)-block secure (for t ≤ d−2), then the adversary is
able to guess the correct messages with probability 1/qn−t−k.
For an adversary of strength t > d, the security of the
scheme depends on the properties of the code employed, in
particular, it depends on the weight distribution of C. From
Theorem 4.4, if there exists c ∈ C with wt(c) = w, then
the scheme is not weakly secure against some adversary of
strength t = w − 1. In general, the scheme might still be (b-
block or weakly) secure against some adversaries of strength
t for t ≥ d. While we cannot make a general conclusion on
the security of the scheme when the adversary’s strength is
larger than d− 1, Lemma 4.2 is still a useful tool to evaluate
the security in that situation. However, as the next theorem
shows, if the size of XA is sufficiently large, then A is able
to determine all the messages in {xi}i∈X̂A .
Theorem 4.5: Suppose that the settings of the coding
scheme for the ICSI problem are defined as in Theorem 4.4.
Then the scheme is completely insecure against any adversary
of strength t > n−d⊥+1, where d⊥ denotes the dual distance
of C.
Proof: Suppose the adversary knows a subset {xi}i∈XA ,
XA ⊆ [n] and |XA| = t ≥ n − d⊥ + 1. By Corollary 4.3,
it suffices to show that for all i /∈ XA, there exists u ∈ Fnq
satisfying simultaneously uC XA and u+ ei ∈ C.
7Indeed, take any i ∈ X̂A, and let ρ = n − t 6 d⊥ − 1.
Consider the ρ indices which are not in XA. By Theorem 2.2,
there exists a codeword c ∈ C with
c` =
{
1 if ` = i,
0 if ` /∈ XA ∪ {i}
.
Then supp(c) ⊆ XA ∪ {i}. We define u ∈ Fnq such that u C
XA, as follows. For ` ∈ XA, we set u` = c`, and for ` /∈
XA, we set u` = 0. It is immediately clear that c = u + ei.
Therefore, by Corollary 4.3, the adversary can reconstruct xi.
We have shown that the scheme is completely insecure against
an arbitrary set XA satisfying |XA| ≥ n − d⊥ + 1, hence
completing the proof.
When C is an MDS code, we have n − d⊥ + 1 = d − 1,
and hence the two bounds established in Theorems 4.4 and 4.5
are actually tight. The following example further illustrates the
results stated in these theorems.
Example 4.2: Let n = 7,m = 7, q = 2. Suppose that the
receivers have in their possession set of messages as appears
in the third column of the table below. Suppose also, that the
demands of all receivers are as in the second column of the
table.
Receiver Demand {xi}i∈Xj
R1 x1 {x6, x7}
R2 x2 {x5, x7}
R3 x3 {x5, x6}
R4 x4 {x5, x6, x7}
R5 x5 {x1, x2, x6}
R6 x6 {x1, x3, x4}
R7 x7 {x2, x3, x6}
For j = 1, 2, . . . , 7, let v(j) ∈ F72 such that supp(v(j)) =
Xj . Assume that this scheme uses the code C = span({v(j) +
ej}j∈[7]). Then the set {c(j) 4= v(j) + ej}j∈[4] forms a basis
for C. It is easy to see that this C is a [7, 4, 3]2 Hamming code
with d = 3 and d⊥ = 4.
Suppose that S broadcasts the following four bits:
s1 = (v
(1) + e1) · x = c(1) · x ,
s2 = (v
(2) + e2) · x = c(2) · x ,
s3 = (v
(3) + e3) · x = c(3) · x ,
s4 = (v
(4) + e4) · x = c(4) · x .
Each Rj , j = 1, 2, . . . , 7, can compute (v(j) + ej) · x by
using linear combination of s1, s2, s3, s4. Then, each Rj can
subtract v(j) · x (his side information) from (v(j) + ej) · x to
retrieve xj = ej · x.
For example, consider R5. Since(
v(5) + e5
)
·x =
(
(v(1) + e1) + (v
(2) + e2)
)
·x = s1 +s2 ,
R5 subtracts x1 + x2 + x6 from s1 + s2 to obtain
(s1 + s2)− (x1 + x2 + x6)
= (x1 + x2 + x5 + x6)− (x1 + x2 + x6)
= x5 .
If an adversary A has a knowledge of a single message xi,
then by Theorem 4.4, A is not able to determine any other
message x`, for ` 6= i. Indeed, d(C) = 3, while t = 1.
Therefore, the scheme is weakly secure against all adversaries
of strength t = 1. Similarly, if the adversary knows none of the
messages in advance, then the adversary has no information
about any group of 2 messages. On the other hand, the scheme
is completely insecure against any adversary of strength t > 4;
in that case A is able to recover the remaining n−t messages.
D. Role of the Field Size
The following example demonstrates that the use of codes
over larger fields might have a positive impact on the security
level. More specifically, in that example, codes over large
fields significantly enhance the security, compared with the
codes over small field.
Example 4.3: Suppose that the source S has n messages
x1, x2, . . . , xn. Assume that there are m < n receivers
R1, R2, . . . , Rm, and each receiver Rj has the same set of
side information, Xj = {m + 1,m + 2, . . . , n}. Assume also
that each Rj requires xj , for j ∈ [m].
We can define the ICSI scheme based on the code C, as
above. The code employed in this scheme has dimension at
least m, since all the vectors v(j) + ej , for some v(j) C Xj ,
j ∈ [m], are linearly independent. Therefore, the number of
transmission required in this scheme is at least m, which is
equal to the number of transmissions in the trivial solution
(just broadcasting each of x1, x2, . . . , xm).
If we employ a binary code C, for the large values of n
the minimum distance d of C is bounded from above by a
sphere-packing bound
d 6 2n · (H−12 (1−m/n)− ) ,
where  → 0 as n → ∞. Hence the scheme, which uses a
binary code, is secure against any adversary of strength t 6 d−
2. It is insecure against some adversaries of strength t > d−1.
There is a variety of stronger upper bounds on the minimum
distance of binary codes, such as the Johnson bound, the Elias
bound, and the McEliece-Rodemich-Rumsey-Welch bound
(see [20, Chapter 4.5] for more details). These bounds provide
even stronger bounds on the security of this ICSI scheme,
when the scheme is based on the binary code.
By contrast, consider an q-ary code C, for q ≥ n + 1
(we also assume here that all xi are in Fq). There exists
a q-ary MDS code C of length n, dimension m, and with
the minimum distance equal n −m + 1 (for example, Reed-
Solomon code). By employing this code, the new scheme is
secure against all adversaries of strength t 6 n −m − 1. In
order to find an appropriate generator matrix for the Reed-
Solomon code for the settings of this example, we start with
some generator matrix of Reed-Solomon code, and then apply
Gaussian elimination to obtain a new generator matrix of the
form G = (Im|P), where P is a m × (n −m) matrix over
Fq .
It is well known that there is a significant gap between
the Singleton bound and the sphere-packing bound (see [20,
8p. 111] for details). Therefore, for some ICSI instances, coding
over large fields can provide significantly higher levels of
security than binary coding.
V. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this paper, we analyze the levels of security of linear
solutions for the ICSI problem and establish two new bounds.
These bounds employ the minimum distance and the dual
distance of the linear code used in the scheme. While the
dimension of this code corresponds to the number of trans-
missions in the scheme, the minimum distance is related to
the security of the scheme. The generating matrix of the code
depends on the sets of messages that each receiver owns.
However, there are various generating matrices that can be
used for the same instance of ICSI problems. Moreover, punc-
turing of some nonzero entries in the generating matrix, could
probably lead to a code with a better minimum distance, which
in turn corresponds to a ICSI scheme with stronger security.
Thus, the question which remains open is how to design a
code for a particular instance of the ICSI problem, which has
the largest possible minimum distance. It is very likely that
finding such a code is a hard problem. For comparison, even
finding the minimum distance of a code given by its generating
matrix is known to be NP-hard [21].
The following simple generalization of the ICSI problem
is called Network Coding with Side Information (NCSI)
problem. Consider a network with a sender S, possessing n
messages, and m receivers R1, R2, . . . , Rm. Each Rj requests
one message. Suppose that each Rj has some side information,
namely Rj knows some subset of these n messages. There is
also an adversary A, listening to some links in the network,
who possesses some of the messages. Given an instance of the
NCSI problem, the following questions arise:
1) Is it possible to satisfy all the requests simultaneously by
a single transmission, using linear network coding?
2) If there exists network coding solution, how secure is it?
Some techniques, presented in this paper, can be extended to
provide sufficient (and sometimes necessary) conditions for an
existence of a linear solution for the NCSI problem, and to
analyze the level of security of such a solution. We omit the
details from this paper.
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